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Abstract. In a multi-objective game, each individual’s payoff is a vector-
valued function of everyone’s actions. Under such vectorial payoffs, Pareto-
efficiency is used to formulate each individual’s best-response condition,
inducing Pareto-Nash equilibria as the fundamental solution concept. In
this work, we follow a classical game-theoretic agenda to study equilib-
ria. Firstly, we show in several ways that numerous pure-strategy Pareto-
Nash equilibria exist. Secondly, we propose a more consistent extension
to mixed-strategy equilibria. Thirdly, we introduce a measurement of
the efficiency of multiple objectives games, which purpose is to keep the
information on each objective: the multi-objective coordination ratio.
Finally, we provide algorithms that compute Pareto-Nash equilibria and
that compute or approximate the multi-objective coordination ratio.
Keywords: Multi-objective Game · Pareto-Nash Equilibrium
1 Introduction
Game theory and microeconomics assume that individuals evaluate outcomes
into scalars. However, bounded rationality can hardly be modeled consistently
by agents simply comparing scalars: “The classical theory does not tolerate the
incomparability of oranges and apples.” [35]. Money is another case of scalariza-
tion of the values of outcomes. For instance, while ‘making money’ theoretically
creates value [36], the tobacco industry making money and killing approximately
six million people every year [42] is hardly a creation of value1.
In this work, we assume that agents evaluate outcomes over a finite set of
distinct objectives2; hence, agents have vectorial payoffs. For instance, in the
case of tobacco consumers, this slightly more informative model would keep the
information on these three objectives [7]: smoking pleasure, cigarette cost and
consequences on life expectancy. In literature, this model was called games with
vectorial payoffs, multi-objective games or multi-criteria games; and several ap-
plications were considered (see e.g. [43,41]). Indeed, behaviors are less assump-
tively modeled by a partial preference: the Pareto-dominance. Using Pareto-
1 Tobacco consumers are free to value and choose cigarettes how it pleases them.
However, is value the same when they inhale, as when they die suffocating?
2 It is a backtrack from the subjective theory of value, which typically aggregates
values on each objective/commodity into a single scalar by using an utility function.
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efficiency in place of best-response condition induces Pareto-Nash (PN) equilib-
ria as the solution concept for stability, without even assuming that individuals
combine the objectives in a precise manner. Pareto-Nash equilibria encompass
the outcomes, even under unknown, uncertain or inconsistent preferences.
This paper more particularly addresses two unexplored issues.
(1) The algorithmic aspects of multi-objective games have never been studied.
(2) Also, the efficiency of Pareto-Nash equilibria has never been a concern.
Related literature on mixed-strategies and similar strategy spaces. Games
with vectorial payoffs, or multi-objective games, were firstly introduced in the
late fifties by Blackwell and Shapley [2,34]. The former shows the existence of
a mixed-strategy Pareto-Nash equilibrium in finite two-player zero-sum multi-
objective games. The later generalizes this existence result to finite multi-objective
games. Both use a definition of mixed-strategy Pareto-Nash equilibria that suf-
fers an inconsistency: pure-strategy Pareto-Nash equilibria are not included in
the set of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria (see Sec. 4). Nonetheless, there is an
established literature on games with vector payoffs that uses this definition.
Deep formal works generalized known existence results [34] to individual action-
sets being compact convex subsets of a normed space [40]. Weak Pareto-Nash
equilibria can be approximated [26].
Works related to pure strategies and algorithms. [41] achieves to character-
ize the entire set of Pareto-Nash equilibria by mean of augmented Tchebycheff
norms. However, the number of dimensions that parameterize these Tchebycheff
norms is algorithmically prohibitive. [30] shows that a MO potential function
guarantees that a Pareto-Nash equilibrium exists in finite MO games.
In Section 3, we show in three different settings that pure-strategy Pareto-
Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist, or very likely to be numerous. In Section
4, we show an inconsistency in the current concept of mixed-strategy PN equi-
librium, and propose an extension to solve this flaw. In Section 5, in the fashion
of the price of anarchy [23], we define a measurement of the worst-case effi-
ciency of individualistic behaviors in games, compared to the optimum. In the
multi-objective case, it is far from trivial, as worst-case equilibria and optima are
not uniquely defined. In Section 6, we show how to compute the set of (worst)
pure-strategy Pareto-Nash equilibria for several game structures, and provide al-
gorithms to compute and approximate our multi-objective coordination ratio.3
2 Preliminaries
Definition 1. A multi-objective game (MO game, or MOG) is defined by the
following tuple
(
N, {Ai}i∈N ,D, {ui}i∈N
)
:
– The agents set is N = {1, . . . , n}. Agent i decides action ai in action-set Ai.
– The shared list of objectives is denoted by D = {1, . . . , d} and every agent
i ∈ N gets her payoff from function ui : A = A1 × . . . × An → Rd which
maps every overall action to a vector-valued payoff; e.g., real uik(a) is the
payoff of agent i on objective k for action-profile a = (a1, . . . , an).
3 For the proofs, see the long paper:
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Fig. 1: Didactic toy example in Ocean Shores city.
There are five shops (the nodes) in Ocean Shores: N = {1, . . . , 5}. Each shop/agent
i decides between two activities: Ai = {ai, bi}; for instance: renting bikes or buggies,
selling clams or fruit, etc. That is, agent i, in his payoff table ui, decides row ai or bi. The
edges define neighborhoods around every agent. The payoff of each agent also depends
on the actions of her neighbors, and is differentiated on two objectives D = {1, 2} that
it would hardly make sence to aggregate, for instance: sales revenue (to buy their daily
lives) and the remaining natural resources (so that, in the future, their children could
also live). (Here, the payoffs are random integers.)
In the subjective theory of value, every individual evaluates her endowment
(ui1, . . . , u
i
d) however she wants based on an utility function v
i : Rd → R. The
theory of multi-objective games [2,34] aims at allowing for individuals that be-
have according to several unknown, uncertain, or inconsistent utility functions.
These utility functions are reduced to their common denominator: the Pareto-
dominance, as defined below. That vector y ∈ Rd weakly-Pareto-dominates and
respectively Pareto-dominates vector x ∈ Rd is denoted and defined by:
y % x⇔ ∀k ∈ D, yk ≥ xk,
y  x⇔ ∀k ∈ D, yk ≥ xk and ∃k ∈ D, yk > xk.
For the preferences of individuals, given an adversary action-profile
a−i = (aj | j 6= i), this defines a partial rationality on set
ui(Ai,a−i) = {ui(bi,a−i) | bi ∈ Ai}, which is less assumptive than complete
orders, since it does not presume any individual utility function vi : Rd → R.
Formally, given a finite set of vectors X ⊆ Rd, the set of Pareto-efficient vectors
is defined as the following set of non-Pareto-dominated vectors:
EFF[X] = {y ∈ X | ∀x ∈ X, not (x  y)}.
Since Pareto-dominance is a partial order, it induces a multiplicity of Pareto-
efficient vectors. These are the best compromises between objectives. Similarly,
let WST[X] = {y ∈ X|∀x ∈ X,not(y  x)} denote the worst vectors.
In a multi-objective game, individuals behave according to the Pareto -
dominance, inducing the solution concept Pareto-Nash equilibrium (PN), for-
mally defined as any action-profile a ∈ A such that for every agent i ∈ N :
ui(ai,a−i) ∈ EFF [ {ui(bi,a−i) | bi ∈ Ai} ] .
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Fig. 2: Biobjective set of utilitarian outcomes u(A) ⊂ R2 in Ocean Shores.
The utilitarian outcomes are a set of vectors, de-
picted above. Worst case equilibria and optima
are not uniquely defined. The ratio of set of equi-
libria outcomes E (♦) to set of efficient outcomes
F (×) would be a ratio of sets, which remains
undefined. It would be crucial that such a defini-
tion keeps information for every objective. E.g.,
we want to remember that a car pollutes, or that
a cigarette kills, not just that it makes some eco-
nomic agents happy.
We call these conditions Pareto-efficient responses. Let PN ⊆ A denote the set of
Pareto-Nash equilibria. For instance, in Figure 1, action-profile (b1, b2, a3, b4, b5)
is a PN equilibrium, since each action, given the adversary local action profile
(column), is Pareto-efficient among the given agent’s two actions (rows). In this
example, there are 13 Pareto-Nash equilibria (depicted in Figure 2).
Such an encompassing solution concept provides the first phase for bounding
the efficiency of games. It is well-known that individualistic behaviors can be far
from the optimum/maximum in terms of utilitarian evaluation u(a) =
∑
i∈N u
i(a).
In single-objective games4, this inefficiency is measured by the Coordination Ra-
tio CR = min[u(PN)]max[u(A)] [23], which is more commonly known as the Price of An-
archy [33]. However, in the multi-objective case, the utilitarian social welfare
u(a) =
∑
i∈N u
i(a) is a vector-valued function u : A → Rd with respect to d
objectives. To study the efficiency of Pareto-Nash equilibria, we introduce:
– set of equilibria outcomes E = u(PN) (⊂ Rd),
– set of efficient outcomes F = EFF[u(A)] (⊂ Rd).
3 Numerous pure strategy Pareto-Nash equilibria exist.
This section demonstrates the existence of pure strategy Pareto-Nash equilibria.
Firstly, we write how the existence results from single-objective (SO) games can
be retrieved in MO games. Secondly, we generalize the equilibria existence results
of single-objective potential games to multi-objective potential games. Thirdly,
we show that on average, numerous Pareto-Nash equilibria exist.
3.1 Reductions from MO games to SO games
In the literature, most rationalities are constructed by means of a utility function
vi : Rd → R, which is monotonic with respect to the Pareto-dominance, that is:
x  y ⇒ vi(x) > vi(y)
4 In the single-objective case, Pareto-Nash and Nash equilibria coincide.
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Such functions are called Pareto-monotonic. For instance, these include posi-
tive weighted sums, Cobb-Douglas utilities, and utility functions in general as
assumed by the Arrow-Debreu theorem.
A straightforward consequence is that the set of Pareto-efficient vectors con-
tains the optima of any Pareto-monotonic utility function. Formally, given a
MOG Γ , from Pareto-monotonic utility functions V = (vi : Rd → R|i ∈ N)
the single-objective game V ◦ Γ = (N, {Ai}i∈N , {vi ◦ ui}i∈N ) results from the
given utilities, and one has: PN(V ◦ Γ ) ⊆ PN(Γ ). In other words, Pareto-Nash
equilibria encompass the game’s outcome, regardless of the unknown preferences.
Also, inclusion PN(V ◦ Γ ) ⊆ PN(Γ ) argues for the guaranteed existence of
numerous PN equilibria in MO games, under the following assumptions:
1. the structure of the SO game on every objective is the same,
2. equilibria are guaranteed in that structure of SO game,
3. and a positive linear combination of the MO game induces that SO game.
This remark is the canonical argument used in previous results (e.g. [34,30]).
3.2 Multi-objective potentials
We now explore potential games, as introduced for congestion games by Robert
Rosenthal [32,25] and recently generalized to MO games [30]. The existence of
an MO potential function guarantees that at least one Pareto-Nash equilibrium
exists [30]. We go further and completely characterize the set of PN equilibria.
Definition 2. An MO game Γ =
(
N, {Ai}i∈N ,D, {ui}i∈N
)
admits (exact) po-
tential function Φ : A → Rd if and only if for every action-profile a ∈ A, for
every agent i ∈ N and for every action bi ∈ Ai, one has:
∀k ∈ D, Φk(bi,a−i)− Φk(a) = uik(bi,a−i)− uik(a).
That is, function Φ additively accumulates the vectorial values of each deviation.
Definition 3. Given a vector valued function Φ : A→ Rd, let the set of locally
efficient action-profiles LOC(Φ) be the set of action-profiles a ∈ A such that:
Φ(a) ∈ EFF[{Φ(bi,a−i) ∈ Rd | i ∈ N, bi ∈ Ai}].
Set LOC(Φ) corresponds to a generalization of local optima for function Φ, and is
non-empty if sets N , D and A are finite. Moreover, due to the loose requirement
for local efficiency, set LOC(Φ) is likely to contain numerous action-profiles.
Theorem 1. Let Γ =
(
N, {Ai}i∈N ,D, {ui}i∈N
)
be a finite multi-objective game5
that admits potential function Φ. Then, it holds that:
PN(Γ ) = LOC(Φ) 6= ∅.
This theorem completely characterizes the set of Pareto-Nash equilibria as the
set of locally efficient action-profiles for function Φ, which is a non-empty set
with numerous action-profiles. More generally, Theorem 1 also holds when sets
N and D are finite and sets Ai are just compact.
5 In a finite multi-objective game, sets N , {Ai}i∈N and D are finite.
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3.3 Likelihood of equilibrium in random games
Another manner to study whether a PN-equilibrium exists is to provide a prob-
ability distribution on a family of finite games and then discuss the probability
of PN-equilibrium existence. A similar methodology was successfully applied
[14,12,31] to SO games in several settings where every SO payoff ui(a) is inde-
pendently and identically distributed by a uniform distribution on continuous
intervals [0, 1]. At the heart of this subsection, let random variable Z denote the
number of pure Nash-equilibria action-profiles in the game. In the SO case, there
is almost surely only one best response. However, when considering MO games, a
main technical difference lies in the average number of “best responses” (or here,
Pareto-efficient responses), which in most cases exceeds 1, due to the surface-
like shape of the Pareto-efficient set in Rd, surface which is (d− 1) dimensional.
Here, we assume a probability distribution Pn,α,β , that builds randomly the
Pareto-efficient response tables of an n-agent normal form game with α actions-
per-agent: for every agent i and every adversary action-profile a−i ∈ ∏j 6=iAj ,
there is a fixed number β : 1 < β ≤ α of Pareto-efficient responses, for the sake
of simplicity.
Theorem 2. Given numbers n ≥ 2 of agents, α ≥ 2 of actions-per-agent and
β ≤ α of Pareto-efficient responses, based on probability distribution Pn,α,β, the
number Z of Pareto-Nash equilibria satisfies E[Z] = βn and:
P ((1− γ)βn ≤ Z ≤ (1 + γ)βn) ≥ 1− 1
γ2βn
, ∀γ ∈ (0, 1).
It argues for the existence of numerous Pareto-Nash equilibria when there are
enough agents and efficient responses, and follows from the Bienayme´-Tchebychev
inequality. For instance, (given γ = 1/2) the probability that the number of
Pareto-Nash equilibria Z is between (1/2)βn and (3/2)βn, is at least 1− 4β−n,
which for β = 2 efficient responses and n = 5 agents, gives P(16 ≤ Z ≤ 48) ≥ 7/8.
4 Consistent extension to mixed strategies
To guarantee equilibrium existence by means of fixed-point theorems on compact
sets [37,27], the finite action sets of every agent are expanded to include mixed
strategies. That is: every agent i decides a probability distribution pi in the set
∆(Ai) of probability distributions over his action-set Ai. Each payoff function
ui is redefined to be the expected utility
ui(p) = Ea∼p[ui(a)],
under the mixed-strategy profile p = (p1, . . . , pn) ∈∏i∈N ∆(Ai). This defines a
mixed-extension of the original game. The stability concept induced is called a
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.
In MOGs, Pareto-Nash equilibria based on their original definition by Black-
well [2] and Shapley [34] (below) are those usually considered [3,8,38,43].
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Definition 4. Given finite MO game Γ =
(
N, {Ai}i∈N , {D}, {ui}i∈N
)
, a mixed-
strategy profile p = (p1, . . . , pn) ∈∏i∈N ∆(Ai) is a mixed-strategy Pareto-Nash
equilibrium if and only if it satisfies for every agent i:
ui(pi,p−i) ∈ EFF [{ui(qi,p−i) ∈ Rd | qi ∈ ∆(Ai)}]
The rational behind this first definition is the following. For every agent
i, mixed-strategy pi ∈ ∆(Ai) acts as a convex-combination of set of vectorial
payoffs ui(Ai,p−i) and the best-response condition is replaced by the fact that
mixed-strategy pi should have a Pareto-efficient evaluation ui(pi,p−i) among
the elements of this convex set of evaluations {ui(qi,p−i) ∈ Rd | qi ∈ ∆(Ai)}.
That is, a mixed-strategy Pareto-Nash equilibrium is a pure-strategy Pareto-
Nash equilibrium in finite game Γ ’s mixed extension. However, as depicted in
Figure 3, Definition 1 fails to fulfill two fundamental requirements:
1. Pure-strategy equilibria must be included in mixed-strategy equilibria.
2. Mixed-strategies also enable to model a risk-averse agent.
Proof. Figure 3 demonstrates these side effects.
To fulfill the two requirements, instead of efficient mixed actions, we consider
mixtures of efficient pure-actions. As in Figure 3, it corrects both side effects.
Definition 5. Given a finite multi-objective game
(
N, {Ai}i∈N , {D}, {ui}i∈N
)
,
a mixed-strategy Pareto-Nash equilibrium is a mixed-strategy profile
p = (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ ∏i∈N ∆(Ai), such that for every agent i and action ai ∈ Ai
if ai is played with positive probability pi(ai) > 0, then it holds that
ui(ai,p−i) ∈ EFF [ui(Ai,p−i)] .
This generalized definition connects in the single-objective case to a less
know definition of Nash-equilibria (see [28], page 30, Theorem 2.1). In this al-
ternative definition, each mixed strategy must be a mixture of pure-strategies
that are best-responses. In other words, the support of each mixed strategy must
be included in the set of pure-strategy best-responses. Furthermore, concerning
existence, since this revised definition contains the former one, (which is guar-
anteed to exist) the new definition is guaranteed to exist too.
5 Multi-objective coordination ratio
In the single-objective case, the coordination ratio measures the efficiency loss
of equilibria compared to the optimum. In MO games, we claim that it is critical
to study efficiency with respect to every objective. Even after the actions, the
game analyst still has access to the vectorial payoffs. In this section, we follow the
agenda outlined in the introduction, to define a multi-objective coordination ratio
MO-CR[E ,F ] of the set of equilibria outcomes E to the set of efficient outcomes
F , that fills the critical purpose to keep information on each objective.
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Fig. 3: Single-agent three-actions bi-objective game showing inconsistencies.
(The coordinates correspond to the bi-objective valuation (u1, u2).)
The three outcomes, u(A) = {(1, 4), (2, 2), (4, 1)},
are depicted by black dots. With Def. 4, since
the mixed outcomes are all convex-combinations
of {(1, 4), (2, 2), (4, 1)}, the Pareto-efficient mixed-
strategies are here the convex-combinations of
{(1, 4), (4, 1)}; and outcome (2, 2) is Pareto-
dominated. Not every pure-strategy Pareto-Nash
equilibrium is a mixed-strategy one, which is a severe
inconsistency. Furthermore, since outcome (2, 2) is
well balanced, it may also be decided with a non-null
probability, e.g., if the agent’s utility is concave [6],
or if she is risk-averse [21]. Our revised definition
considers instead all the convex-combinations of the
Pareto-efficient pure actions {(1, 4), (2, 2), (4, 1)}.
First, we state the list of desirable properties that we want the ratio to
satisfy. For the purpose of having meaningful divisions and ratios, some vec-
tors are positive in this section. Given vectors ρ,y ∈ Rd and z ∈ Rd+, vector
ρ ? y ∈ Rd is defined by ∀k ∈ D, (ρ ? y)k = ρkyk. Vector y/z ∈ Rd is defined
by ∀k ∈ D, (y/z)k = yk/zk. Given vector r ∈ Rd and set of vectors Y , set
r ? Y is defined by {r ? y ∈ Rd+|y ∈ Y } and for r ∈ Rd+, set Y/r is defined by
{y/r ∈ Rd|y ∈ Y }. Given x ∈ Rd, cone C(x) denotes {y ∈ Rd | x % y}, and
given X ⊂ Rd, cone-union C(X) is defined by ∪x∈XC(x). Vector 0 denotes a
vector with d zeros, and 1 denotes a vector with d ones.
The first property that we require from MO-CR[E ,F ] is to be on a multi-
objective ratio scale. Given E ,F ⊂ Rd+ and r ∈ Rd+, the following shall hold.
MO-CR[E ,F ] ⊆ Rd (1)
MO-CR[{0},F ] = {0} (2)
MO-CR[r ? E ,F ] = r ?MO-CR[E ,F ] (3)
MO-CR[E , r ? F ] = MO-CR[E ,F ]/r (4)
E ⊆ F ⇔ 1 ∈ MO-CR[E ,F ] (5)
To fix these ideas one can think of d = 1 and given two positive numbers e, f ,
to the properties of ratio e/f . Equation (1) states that MO-CR is expressed in
a multi-objective space. Equations (2), (3) and (4) state that MO-CR is well-
centered and sensitive on each objective to multiplications of outcomes, which is
what we want. For instance, if E is three times better on objective k, then so is
MO-CR. If there are two times more efficient opportunities in F on objective k′,
then MO-CR is one half on objective k′. In other words, the efficiency of each
objective independently reflects on MO-CR in a ratio-scale. Equation (5) states
that if all equilibria outcomes are efficient (i.e. E ⊆ F), then this amounts to
1 ∈ MO-CR[E ,F ], i.e. the MO game is fully efficient.
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These requirements rule out a set of first ideas. For instance, we can rule
out comparisons of equilibria outcomes to ideal vector I = (maxz∈F{zk}|k ∈ D)
does not satisfy requirement (5) to have 1 ∈ MO-CR[E ,F ] when E ⊆ F . By
starting from a social welfare f : Rd+ → R+, taking ratio min f(E)/max f(F),
induces the same problem.
This measurement should also be non-dictatorial, in the sense that no point
of view should be imposed on what the overall efficiency is: no prior choice must
be done on the set of efficient outcomes. Formally, if two sets of efficient out-
comes F ,F ′ ⊂ Rd+ differ even slightly, then this must reflect at least for some
numerator set E onto ratio MO-CR[E ,F ]. This amounts to a disjunction on effi-
cient outcomes. Finally MO-CR[E ,F ] must provide guaranteed efficiency ratios
that hold for every equilibrium outcome y ∈ E , which amounts to a conjunction
on equilibria outcomes. The definition below follows from these requirements.
Firstly, the efficiency of one equilibrium y ∈ E is quantified without prior
choices on what efficient outcome should we compare it to, as required:
R[y,F ] =
⋃
z∈F
C(y/z),
The idea is that we do not take sides with any efficient outcome. Instead, we
define with flexibility and without a dictatorship a disjunctive set of guaranteed
efficiency ratios, which lets the differences between two sets of efficient outcomes
F ,F ′ ⊂ Rd+ reflect onto ratio MO-CR[E ,F ].
Secondly, in MOGs, on average, there are many Pareto-Nash equilibria. An
efficiency guarantee ρ ∈ Rd should hold for every equilibrium outcome. It induces
this conjunctive definition of the set of guaranteed vectorial ratios:
R[E ,F ] =
⋂
y∈E
R[y,F ].
In fact, because of the conjunction on equilibria outcomes, the set R[E ,F ]
only depends on sets WST[E ] (instead of set E) and F .
Finally, if two bounds on efficiencies ρ and ρ′ are such that ρ  ρ′ (e.g. the
former guarantees fraction ρ = (0.75, 0.75) of efficiency and the later fraction
ρ′ = (0.5, 0.5)), then ρ′ brings no more information; hence, MO-CR is defined
using EFF on the guaranteed efficiency ratios R[WST[E ],F ]. These points are
summed up in the following definition:
Definition 6 (MO-CR). Given an MO game, vector ρ ∈ Rd bounds its inef-
ficiency (i.e. ρ ∈ R[E ,F ]) if and only if the following holds (see Fig. 4) :
∀y ∈ E , ∃z ∈ F , y/z % ρ.
The multi-objective coordination ratio MO-CR[E ,F ] is then defined as:
MO-CR[E ,F ] = EFF[R[WST[E ],F ]].
The most famous results of the coordination ratio (or price of anarchy) are
stated analytically on families of games, for instance on congestion games [5,33].
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Fig. 4: Didactic depiction of a guaranteed vectorial ratio ρ from MO-CR[E ,F ].
F = EFF[u(A)]
u2
E = u(PN)
u(A)
u1
F : efficient outcomes
E : equilibria outcomes
ρ ⋆ F
The multi-objective coordination ratio can be
explained by the implications of a vectorial ratio
ρ ∈ MO-CR: for each vector y ∈ E , an efficient
outcome z(y) ∈ F exists such that y Pareto-
dominates vector ρ ? z(y). In other words, equi-
libria outcomes E are at least as good as set of
vectors ρ?F : If ρ ∈ R[E ,F ], then every equilib-
rium satisfies the ratio of efficiency ρ in an un-
specified manner. In other words, the equilibria
outcomes are contained in the “at least as good
as ρ ?F” cone-union, that is: E ⊆ (ρ ?F) +Rd+.
Moreover, since ρ is tight, set E sticks to ρ ?F .
Such results would also be desirable in the multi-objective case. However, the un-
derlying proofs do not survive this generalization: while best response inequalities
can be summed in single-objective cases, here, non-Pareto-dominances cannot.
This issue is independent of the chosen efficiency measurement and motivates
numerical approaches, as proposed in the next section.
6 Computation
In this section, we provide algorithms for computing the set of pure-strategy
Pareto-Nash equilibria and for computing the multi-objective coordination ratio.
6.1 Computing pure-strategy Pareto-Nash equilibria
If the MO game is given in normal form, then it is made of the MO payoffs
of every agent i ∈ N on every action-profile a ∈ A. Since there are nαn such
vectors, where recall that n is the number of agents, α the number of actions per
agent and d the number of objectives, the length of this input is L(n) = nαnd.
Then, enumeration of the action-profiles works efficiently with respect to length
function L, using a simple argument similar to [16].
Theorem 3. Given a MO game in normal form, computing the set of the best
(resp. worst) equilibria outcomes EFF[E ] (resp. WST[E ]) takes polynomial time
O(nαn+1d+ α2nd) = O(L2).
Moreover, if d = 2, this complexity is lowered to quasi-linear-time
O(nαn log2(α)) = O(L log2(α)).
Graphical games provide compact representations of massive multi-agent
games when the payoff functions of the agents only depend on a local sub-
set of the agents [22]. Graphical games can be generalized in a straightfor-
ward manner to assuming vectorial payoffs. Formally, there is a support graph
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G = (N,E) where each vertex represents an agent, and an agent i’s evaluation
function only depends on the actions of the agents in his inner-neighbourhood
N (i) = {j ∈ N |(j, i) ∈ E}. That is ui : AN (i) → Rd maps each local action-
profile aN (i) ∈ AN (i) to a multi-objective payoff ui(aN (i)) ∈ Rd.
Definition 7 (Multi-objective graphical game (MOGG)). An MOGG is
a tuple
(
G = (N,E), {Ai}i∈N ,D, {ui}i∈N
)
. N is the set of agents. {Ai}i∈N
are their individual action-sets. D is the set of all objectives. Every function
ui : AN (i) → Rd is vector-valued, and its scope is vertex i’s neighborhood.
Figure 1 pictures a didactic instance of an MOGG. In the same manner as
computing equilibria in graphical games was reduced to junction-tree algorithms
[9], it is also possible to exploit a generalized MO junction-tree algorithm [13,15].
However, even though this MO junction-tree algorithm is not in polynomial time
(but rather pseudo-polynomial time), it still remains faster than browsing the
Cartesian product of action-sets and is tractable on average, as experimented in
the appendix. Symmetric games [20] can also be generalized to MOGs:
Definition 8. In a multi-objective symmetric game, individual payoffs are not
impacted by the agents’ identities. There is one sole action-set A∗ for every agent
i. So, when deciding action a∗ ∈ A∗, the multi-objective reward only depends
on the number of agents that decided every action. Consequently, the game is
not specified for every action-profile a ∈ A = ∏i∈N A∗ and every agent i, but
rather for every action a∗ ∈ A∗ and every configuration c : A∗ → N, where
number c(a∗) ∈ N indicates the number of agents deciding action a∗. Therefore,
the utility is given by a function u∗ such that u∗(a∗, c) ∈ Rd is the payoff for
deciding action a∗ when configuration c occurs.
There is a number
(
n+α−1
α−1
)
of configurations6 to which the MO symmetric game
associates MO vectors. As a consequence, generalizing to vectorial payoffs, the
representation length is L = α
(
n+α−1
α−1
)
d, and when the numbers α and d are fixed
constant, length is L(n) ∈ Θ (αnαd). Quite simply, for computing E , EFF[E ] and
WST[E ], configurations enumeration already takes polynomial time.
Theorem 4. Given a multi-objective symmetric game with fixed α,
– computing PN and E takes time O(nαα2d) = O(Lα);
– computing EFF[E ] and WST[E ] takes time O(n2αd) = O(L2). If d = 2, this
lowers to O(L(α+ log(L))).
6.2 Computing MO-CR
In this subsection, we address the problem of computing the set MO-CR[E ,F ],
given sets of worst equilibria outcomes WST[E ] and efficient outcomes F . Al-
gorithm 1 (below) computes such set. In the algorithm, set Dt denotes a set
of vectors. Given two vectors, x,y ∈ Rd+, let x ∧ y denote the vector defined
by ∀k ∈ D, (x ∧ y)k = min{xk, yk}, let xy ∈ Rd+ be the vector defined by
∀k ∈ D, (xy)k = (xk)yk , and recall that ∀k ∈ D, (x/y)k = xk/yk.
6 To enumerate the number of ways to distribute number n of symmetric agents into
α parts, one enumerates the ways to choose α−1 “separators” in n+α−1 elements.
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Input: WST[E ] = {y1, . . . ,yq} and F = {z1, . . . , zm}
Output: MO-CR = EFF[R[WST[E ],F ]]
create D1 ← {y1/z ∈ Rd+ | z ∈ F}
for t = 2, . . . , q do
Dt ← EFF[{ρ ∧ (yt/z) | ρ ∈ Dt−1, z ∈ F}]
end
return Dq
Algorithm 1: Computing MO-CR in polynomial-time
Theorem 5. Algorithm 1 outputs MO-CR[E ,F ] in poly-time O((qm)2d−1d),
where q = |WST[E ]| and m = |F| denote the size of the inputs, and d is fixed.
Proof. Algorithm 1 calculates product ∩y∈WST[E] ∪z∈F C(y/z), where there
could be mq terms in the output. This set-algebra of cone-unions is compact.
A decisive corollary is that given an MO game with length L that satisfies
q = O(poly(L)), m = O(poly(L)) and both sets WST[E ] and F are com-
putable in time O(poly(L)), then one can compute MO-CR in polynomial time
O(poly(L)). For instance, it is the case with MO normal forms or MO symmetric
games. So this approach is not intractable in the most basic cases.
6.3 Approximation of the MO-CR for MO compact representations
Unfortunately, Algorithm 1 is not practical when the MO game has a compact
form and cardinalities q,m are exponentials with respect to the compact size
of the game’s representation. For instance, this is the case for multi-objective
graphical games. Theorem 6 below answers this issue by taking only a small
and approximate representation of sets WST[E ] and F , in order to output a
guaranteed approximation of sets MO-CR or R[WST[E ],F ]. This suggests the
following general method:
1. Given a compact MOG representation, compute quickly an approximation
E(ε) of WST[E ] and an approximation F (ε′) of F .
2. Then, given E(ε) and F (ε
′), use Algorithm 1 to approximate the MO-CR.
For this general method to be implemented rigorously, we must specify the
precise definitions of the two approximations required in input, for the desired
output to be indeed some approximation of the MO-CR.
Firstly, let us specify the output. The ratios in R[WST[E ],F ] must be repre-
sented, even approximately, but only by using valid ratios of efficiency, as below.
Definition 9 ((1 + ε)-covering). Given R ⊂ Rd+ and ε > 0, R(ε) ⊂ R is a
(1 + ε)-covering of R, if and only if:
∀ρ ∈ R, ∃ρ′ ∈ R(ε) : (1 + ε)ρ′ % ρ
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For instance, R[WST[E ],F ] is (1+0)-covered by MO-CR = EFF[R[WST[E ],F ]].
Denote ϕ : Rd+ → Nd the discretization into the (1 + ε)-logarithmic grid. Given
a vector x ∈ Rd+, ϕ(x) is defined by: ∀k ∈ D, ϕk(x) = blog(1+ε)(xk)c. A typical
implementation of (1 + ε)-coverings are the logarithmic (1 + ε)-coverings, which
consist in taking one vector of R in each reciprocal image of ϕ(R). That is, for
each l ∈ ϕ(R), take one ρ in ϕ−1(l). The logarithmic grid is depicted in Fig. 5.
Now we must specify rigorously what approximate representations E(ε1) of
set WST[E ], and F (ε2) of set F we should take in input, in order to guarantee
that R[E(ε1), F (ε2)] is an (1 + ε)-covering of R[WST[E ],F ]. Definitions 10 and
11 come from the need of specific approximate representations that will carry
the guarantees to the approximate final output R[E(ε1), F (ε2)].
Definition 10 ((1+ε)-under-covering). Given ε > 0, E ⊂ Rd+ and E(ε) ⊂ Rd+,
E(ε) (1 + ε)-under-covers E if and only if:
∀y ∈ E, ∃y′ ∈ E(ε) : y % y′
and ∀y′ ∈ E(ε), ∃y ∈ E : (1 + ε)y′ % y
The first condition states that E(ε) bounds E from below. The second condi-
tion states that this lower bound is precise within a multiplicative (1+ε). Given
E, one can implement Definition 10 by using the log-grid (see e.g. Fig. 5):
E(ε) ←WST [ { el ∈ Rd+ | l ∈ ϕ (WST[E ])} ]
where ϕ(WST[E ]) = {ϕ(y) ∈ Nd | y ∈WST[E ]}, and given l ∈ Nd, the vector el
is defined by (el)k = (1 + ε)
lk . Now let us state what approximation is required
on the set of efficient outcomes F .
Definition 11 ((1+ε)-stick-covering). Given ε > 0, F ⊂ Rd+ and F (ε) ⊂ Rd+,
F (ε) (1 + ε)-stick-covers F if and only if:
∀z′ ∈ F (ε), ∃z ∈ F : z′ % z
and ∀z ∈ F, ∃z′ ∈ F (ε) : (1 + ε)z % z′
The first condition is easily satisfiable by F (ε) ⊆ F . The second condition states
that F (ε) sticks to F . Given F , one can implement Definition 11 as in Figure 5:
Take one element of F per cell of the logarithmic grid, and then take WST of
this set of elements. Now we can state that with an approximate Phase 1, the
precision transfers to Phase 2 in polynomial time, as follows.
Lemma 1. Given ε1, ε2 > 0 and approximations E of E and F of F , if
∀y ∈ E ,∃y′ ∈ E, y % y′ and ∀y′ ∈ E,∃y ∈ E , (1 + ε1)y′ % y (6)
∀z′ ∈ F,∃z ∈ F , z′ % z and ∀z ∈ F ,∃z′ ∈ F, (1 + ε2)z % z′ (7)
holds, then it follows that R[E,F ] ⊆ R[E ,F ] and:
∀ρ ∈ R[E ,F ], ∃ρ′ ∈ R[E,F ], (1 + ε1)(1 + ε2)ρ′ % ρ (8)
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Fig. 5: MO approximations, depictions of under and stick coverings
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
ϕ1(u)
ϕ2(u)
F
F (ε)
WST[E ]
E(ε)
E(ε) (the green dots below WST[E ]) is a
(1 + ε)-under-covering of set WST[E ].
F (ε) (the three red dots in F) is a (1+ε)-
stick-covering of the dark-red set F .
Equations (6) and (7) state approximation bounds as in Definitions 10 and
11. Equations (6) state that (1 + ε1)
−1E bounds below E which bounds below
E . Equations (7) state that F bounds below F which bounds below (1 + ε2)F .
Crucially, whatever the sizes of E and F , there exist such approximations E
and F with respective sizes O((1/ε1)
d−1) and O((1/ε2)d−1) [29], yielding the
approximation scheme below.
Theorem 6 (Approximation Scheme for MO-CR). Given a compact MOG
of representation length L, precisions ε1, ε2 > 0 and two algorithms to compute
approximations E of E and F of F in the sense of Equations (6) and (7) that
take time θE(ε1, L) and θF (ε2, L), one can approximate R[E ,F ] in the sense of
Equation (8) in time O
(
θE(ε1, L) + θF (ε2, L) + (ε1ε2)−(d−1)(2d−1)
)
.
For MO graphical games, Phase 1 could be instantiated with approximate junction-
tree algorithms on MO graphical models [13]. For MO symmetric action-graph
games, in the same fashion, one could generalize existing algorithms [20]. More
generally, for the worst equilibria WST[E ] and the efficient outcomes F , one
could also use meta-heuristics with experimental guarantees.
7 Conclusion: discussion and prospects
Along with equilibrium existence, potential functions also usually guarantee
the convergence of best-response dynamics. This easily generalizes to dynam-
ics where every deviation step is an individual Pareto-improvement. However,
when studying a dynamics based on a refinement of the Pareto-dominance, con-
vergence is not always guaranteed.
Pareto-Nash equilibria, which encompass the possible outcomes of MO games,
very likely exist. The precision of PN-equilibria inevitably relies on the uncer-
tainty on preferences. A promising research path would be to linearly constrain
the utility functions of agents. This would induce a polytope and would boil
down to another MO game where every objective corresponds to an extreme
point of the induced polytope. The efficiency of several multi-objective games
could be analyzed by using the contributions in this paper.
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8 Proof of Theorem 1
Let 0d ∈ Rd denote the d-dimensional MO vector with d zero components. Let
a ∈ A be an action-profile. To state that a is a PN-equilibrium is equivalent to
state that for every agent i and every individual deviation bi ∈ Ai, it holds that:
ui(bi, a−i) 6 ui(a)
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From the definition of a potential Φ, it is equivalent to state that, for every agent
i and every individual deviation bi ∈ Ai, it holds that:
Φ(bi, a−i)− Φ(a) = ui(bi, a−i)− ui(a) 6 0d
That is, Φ(bi, a−i) 6 Φ(a), which means that a ∈ LOC(Φ).
Furthermore, the existence of local optima for the potential function general-
izes to the MO case: The set of locally-Pareto-efficient action-profiles is necessar-
ily non-empty, otherwise, given t ∈ N, whatever the action-profile a(t), one could
always find an action-profile a(t+1) in its neighbourhood of individual deviations,
such that Φ(a(t+1))  Φ(a(t)). Therefore, one could build an infinite sequence
(a(t))t∈N such that Φ(a(t+1))  Φ(a(t)); and since the Pareto-dominance  is a
strict partial order and Φ a (deterministic) function, one would have an infinite
number of distinct action-profiles, contradicting the fact that |A| ≤ αn is finite.
9 Proof of Theorem 2
We will denote by Pn,α,pi the probability distribution that draws a normal form
game (SO or MO) with n agents, α = αi = |Ai| actions-per-agent, and the pay-
offs ui(a) according to the distribution pi on R or Rd. Also, according to Pn,α,pi,
given an agent i and an action-profile a = (ai, a−i), let us denote by Xi,a ∈ {0, 1}
the random variable (RV) which is equal to 1 if and only if for agent i, the action
ai is a best response (or efficient response) to the adversary action-profile a−i.
Given an action-profile a, let us denote by Ya = mini∈N{Xi,a} the binary RV
which is equal to 1 if and only if the action-profile a is a PN equilibrium. Finally,
let Z =
∑
a∈A Ya denote the number of pure Nash-equilibria action-profiles in
the game. For simplicity, we may use the name of a binary random variable as
a shorthand for the event that this RV equals 1. Since for every agent i and ev-
ery adversary action-profile a−i there is (almost surely) only one best-response
bi ∈ Ai in ui(Ai, a−i) (because payoffs are almost surely different), an IID uni-
form distribution on [0, 1] amounts to whatever IID distribution that will almost
surely draw uniformly one single best-response in ui(Ai, a−i).
Generalization to multi-objective. While in the SO case, there is almost surely
only one best-response, when considering MO games, the main technical differ-
ence lies in the average number of “best-responses” (or here, Pareto-efficient
responses) which is in most cases greater than 1, due to the (d− 1) dimensional
surface-like shape of the Pareto-efficient set in Rd. For instance, it can be shown
that when drawing a number α of MO payoffs according to a uniform distri-
bution on the simplex SD = {u ∈ Rd+ |
∑
k∈D uk ≤ 1}, then by counting the
vectors on the outer face, the number β of Pareto-efficient vectors among the α
vectors satisfies:
E[β] ∼ d
(d!)1/d
α
d−1
d as α→∞ (9)
in the sense that the ratio of the left and right members of ∼ tends to 1. As
a consequence, on the simplex SD, one quickly has a number of Pareto-efficient
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responses β strictly greater than 1 as the number of actions α grows. (The
number of objectives d is fixed.)
For the sake of simplicity, we then assume a probability distribution Pn,α,β ,
that builds randomly an n-agents normal form game with α actions-per-agent.
For the sake of simplicity, for every agent i, and every adversary action-profile
a−i ∈ ∏j 6=iAj , there is a fixed number β : 1 ≤ β ≤ α of Pareto-efficient
responses (supposedly, according to some vectorial payoffs ui(Ai, a−i) selected
independently and uniformly at random in Ai). Recall that the number β can
be reasonably supposed greater than 1 (see Equation 9).
[1] Recall that the Bienayme´-Tchebychev inequality states that for a ran-
dom variable Z with expectancy E[Z] and variance Var[Z], for every parameter
µ ∈ R+ it holds that:
P(|Z − E[Z]| ≥ µ) ≤ Var[Z]
µ
In simple words, a random variable is unlikely to spread more than its variance.
Let us now study the expectation of the number of PN-equilibria En,α,β [Z].
One has:
En,α,β [Z] = En,α,β
[∑
a∈A
Ya
]
(10)
=
∑
a∈A
En,α,β [Ya] (11)
=
∑
a∈A
En,α,β
[
min
i∈N
Xi,a
]
(12)
=
∑
a∈A
Pn,α,β (∧i∈N{Xi,a}) (13)
=
∑
a∈A
∏
i∈N
Pn,α,β (Xi,a) (14)
=
∑
a∈A
∏
i∈N
β
α
(15)
= αn(β/α)n (16)
= βn (17)
Equation (10) uses the definition of the RV Z. Equation (11) uses the linearity
of expectation. Equation (12) uses the definition of the RV Ya. Equation (13)
formulates it as an event. Equation (14) uses the independence of payoffs be-
tween agents. Equation (15) uses the definition the probability Pn,α,β : uniform.
Equation (16) uses that |A| = αn and that ∏i∈N (β/α) = (β/α)n. Equation
(17) concludes that: E[Z] = βn. Therefore, the number of PN-equilibria Z is in
expectation an exponential of basis β with respect to the number of agents n.
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Let us now study the variance of the number of PN-equilibria Z:
Var (Z) (18)
= Var
(∑
a∈A
Ya
)
(19)
=
∑
a∈A
∑
b∈A
Cov(Ya, Yb) (20)
=
∑
a∈A
∑
b∈A
E[YaYb]− E[Ya]E[Yb] (21)
=
∑
b∈A
∑
a∈A
(∏
i∈N
P(Xi,aXi,b)−
(
β
α
)2n)
(22)
Equation (19) uses the definition of the RV Z. Equation (20) is the variance
of the sum of RVs
∑
a∈A Ya. Equation (21) uses the definition of the covari-
ance Cov(Ya, Yb). In Equation (22) the first terms E[YaYb] =
∏
i∈N P(Xi,aXi,b)
result from the independences of payoffs between players. The second terms
E[Ya]E[Yb] = (β/α)2n result from the same calculus as for the expectation E[Z].
Remark that by symmetry, all the αn terms of the outer sum are equal. Fixing
an action-profile b ∈ A, let us continue this calculus below:
Var (Z) = αn
∑
a∈A
(∏
i∈N
P(Xi,aXi,b)−
(
β
α
)2n)
(23)
Now, having fixed an action-profile b ∈ A, given an action-profile a and an agent
i, let us study the value of the probability P(Xi,a, Xi,b). Remark that it will
depend on whether the random variables Xi,a and Xi,b are independent or not:
– If a−i 6= b−i, then the payoffs are independent, and one has the probability:
P(Xi,a, Xi,b) = P(Xi,a)P(Xi,b) = (β/α)2
– If a−i = b−i with ai 6= bi, then the payoffs are dependent, and one has the
probability:
P(Xi,a, Xi,b) = P(Xi,a | Xi,b)P(Xi,b) = (β − 1)β
α2
– Finally, if a = b, then P(Xi,a, Xi,b) = P(Xi,a) = β/α.
Now, (having fixed an action-profile b ∈ A) let us study the terms in the sum∑
a∈A. Given an action-profile a ∈ A, one has:
• If a = b, which occurs exactly once, then P(Xi,a, Xi,b) = β/α, and the term∏
i∈N P(Xi,aXi,b)− (β/α)2n equals (β/α)n − (β/α)2n.
• If for some agent i, it holds that a−i = b−i with ai 6= bi, then a distinct
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agent j cannot satisfy a−j = b−j , because of ai 6= bi; hence the other agents
(other than agent i) fall into the case of a−j 6= b−j . This occurs exactly n(α−1)
times, and then while it holds that P(Xi,a, Xi,b) = (β − 1)β/α2 for agent i, for
the other agents j, it holds that P(Xj,a, Xj,b) = (β/α)2. Therefore, the term∏
i∈N P(Xi,aXi,b)− (β/α)2n equals ((β − 1)β/α2)(β/α)2n−2 − (β/α)2n, that is:
∏
i∈N P(Xi,aXi,b)− (β/α)
2n
=
(β − 1)β2n−1 − β2n
α2n
=
−β2n−1
α2n
• In the last case, if for every agent i, it holds that a−i 6= b−i, then the term
cancels.
To conclude, the variance of the number of Pareto-Nash equilibria is:
Var (Z) (24)
= αn
∑
a∈A
(∏
i∈N P(Xi,aXi,b) − (β/α)
2n
)
(25)
= αn
(
(β/α)n − (β/α)2n − n(α− 1)β2n−1/α2n) (26)
= βn
(
1− (β/α)n − n(α− 1)βn−1/αn) (27)
= βn (1− (β/α)n(1 + n(α− 1)/β) ) (28)
≤ βn (29)
To finish, since we have an expectation E[Z] = βn and a variance Var(Z) ≤ βn,
a straightforward use of the Bienayme´-Tchebychev inequality concludes that for
any given number γ ∈ (0, 1), it holds that:
P(|Z − βn| ≤ γβn) ≥ 1− β
n
γ2β2n
(30)
= 1− 1
γ2βn
(31)
10 Proofs concerning the properties of the multi-objective
coordination ratio
We show that Definition 6 satisfies the following. Given E ,F ⊂ Rd+ and r ∈ Rd+:
MO-CR[E ,F ] ⊆ Rd+ (32)
MO-CR[{0},F ] = {0} (33)
MO-CR[r ? E ,F ] = r ?MO-CR[E ,F ] (34)
MO-CR[E , r ? F ] = MO-CR[E ,F ]/r (35)
E ⊆ F ⇔ 1 ∈ MO-CR[E ,F ] (36)
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Property (32) By definition, set MO-CR[E ,F ] is a set of vectors in Rd.
Property (33) If E = {0}, then the condition ρ ∈ R[E ,F ], which is ∀y ∈ E ,
∃z ∈ F , y/z % ρ, rewrites 0 % ρ. Then EFF[C(0)] = {0}.
Property (34) We just need to show that R[r?E ,F ] = r?R[E ,F ]. Condition
ρ ∈ R[r ? E ,F ] rewrites into ∀y ∈ E , ∃z ∈ F , r ? y/z % ρ. Then one has
ρ ∈ r ? R[E ,F ]. The converse also holds by a similar argument.
Property (35) Similarly, one can show that R[E , r ? F ] = R[E ,F ]/r.
Property (36) First, note that since F dominates E , it is not possible to
have ρ  1 in R[E ,F ]. Second, for every y ∈ E , one can then take z = y, and
since 1/1 % 1, one has 1 ∈ R[E ,F ]. One can also show that if E 6⊆ F then
1 6∈ MO-CR[E ,F ].
11 Proof of Theorem 3
The computation of the best equilibria outcomes EFF[E ] can be achieved by (1)
computing the PN equilibria PN ⊆ A, then (2) computing the equilibria out-
comes E = u(PN) ⊆ Rd and finally (3) computing the best equilibria outcomes
EFF[E ] ⊆ E (or the worst ones WST[E ] ⊆ E).
(1) For this purpose, for every agent i ∈ N and each adversary action pro-
file a−i ∈ A−i, one has to compute which individual actions give a Pareto-
efficient evaluation in ui(Ai, a−i) (which takes time O(α2d), or if d = 2 then
O(α log2(α))), in order to mark which action-profiles can be a PN equilibrium
from i’s point of view. Hence, computing PN takes time O(nαn−1α2d) (or if
d = 2 O(nαn log2(α))). In the worst case, PN = A hence |PN| = O(αn).
Then, (2) computing the image through total-utilitarianism E = u(PN) re-
quires for each a ∈ PN the addition of n vectors, in time nd|PN| = O(nαnd).
(3) Finally, the computation of EFF[E ] given E takes timeO(|E|2d) = O(α2nd);
and the same holds for WST[E ]. To sum up, the computation of EFF[E ] (or of
WST[E ]) takes time O(nαn+1d + α2nd). If d = 2, this significantly lowers to
O(nαn log2(α)), by using a data structure (e.g. an AVL tree) that orders vectors
according to the first objective and does comparisons on the second objective.
12 Proof of Theorem 4
Since the game is symmetric, every configuration c represents an equivalence
class in the set of action-profiles A; hence, a set of configurations represents a
subset of the action-profiles. Therefore, in order to compute the set of Pareto-
Nash equilibria PN ⊆ A, a set of configurations is an acceptable output and
even a more compact one. The problem to decide if a given configuration c is
a (pure-strategy) Pareto-Nash equilibrium is easy: one only has to test for ev-
ery action a∗ ∈ A∗ such that7 c(a∗) ≥ 1, if that action is a Pareto-efficient
individual decision. An individual deviation to another action b∗ ∈ A∗ induces
the configuration c′ obtained from the configuration c by subtracting 1 from
7 That is such that the action a∗ is decided by someone.
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the number c(a∗) and adding 1 to the number c(b∗) of agents deciding the ac-
tion b∗. Therefore, testing if a configuration c is a PN equilibrium takes time
O(α2d). As a consequence, the computation of the set of PN equilibria takes
times O(nαα2d), that is poly-time O(Lα). Also, computing an utilitarian eval-
uation u(c) =
∑
a∗∈A∗ c(a
∗)u∗(a∗, c) ∈ Rd requires O(α) multiplications and
additions; hence computing the set of equilibria outcomes E = u(PN) (starting
from the set PN which size is O(L)) also takes poly-time O(Lα). Since the num-
ber of equilibria outcomes is bounded by the number of configurations, it follows
that computing the sets of best and worst equilibria EFF[E ] and WST[E ] takes
time O(n2αd), that is poly-time O(L2).
13 Proof of Theorem 5
In order to compute MO-CR = EFF[R[WST[E ],F ]], let us study the structure
of
⋂
y∈WST[E]
⋃
z∈F C(y/z), by restricting a set-algebra to the following objects:
Definition 12 (Cone-Union). For set of vectors X ⊆ Rd+, Cone-Union C(X)
is:
C(X) =
⋃
x∈X
C(x) = {y ∈ Rd+ | ∃x ∈ X,x % y}
Let C denote the set of all cone-unions of Rd+.
To define an algebra on C, one can supply C with ∪ and ∩.
Lemma 2 (On the Set-Algebra (C,∪,∩)).
Given two descriptions of cone-unions X1, X2 ⊆ Rd+, we have:
C(X1) ∪ C(X2) = C(X1 ∪X2)
Given two descriptions of cones x1, x2 ∈ Rd+, we have:
C(x1) ∩ C(x2) = C(x1 ∧ x2)
where x1 ∧ x2 ∈ Rd+ is: ∀k ∈ D, (x1 ∧ x2)k = min{x1k, x2k}.
Given two descriptions of cone-unions X1, X2 ⊆ Rd+, we have:
C(X1) ∩ C(X2) = (∪x1∈X1C(x1)) ∩ (∪x2∈X2C(x2))
=
⋃
(x1,x2)∈X1×X2
C(x1) ∩ C(x2)
=
⋃
(x1,x2)∈X1×X2
C(x1 ∧ x2)
= C(X1 ∧X2)
where X1 ∧X2 = {x1 ∧ x2 | x1 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2} ⊆ Rd+.
Therefore, (C,∪,∩) is stable, and then is a set-algebra.
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Proof. The three properties derive from set calculus.
The main consequence of Lemma 2 is thatR[WST[E ],F ] = ∩y∈WST[E]∪z∈FC(y/z)
is a cone-union. Moreover, one can do the expansion for ∩y∈WST[E]∪z∈F C(y/z)
within the cone-unions, using expansions.
Remark 1. For a finite set X ⊆ Rd+, we have: C(X) = C(EFF[X]).
Proof. Firstly, we prove C(X) ⊆ C(EFF[X]). If y ∈ C(X), then there exists
x ∈ X such that x % y. There are two cases, x ∈ EFF[X] and x 6∈ EFF[X]. If
x ∈ EFF[X], then y ∈ C(EFF[X]), by definition of a cone-union. Otherwise, if
x 6∈ EFF[X], then there exists z ∈ X such that z  x. And since X is finite,
we can find such a z in EFF[X], by iteratively taking z′  z and z ← z′,
until z′ ∈ EFF[X], which will happen because X is finite and  is transitive
and irreflexive. Hence, there exists z ∈ EFF[X] such that z  x % y and then
z  y. Consequently, y ∈ C(EFF[X]), by definition of a cone-union. Conversely,
Y ⊆ X ⇒ C(Y ) ⊆ C(X) proves C(EFF[X]) ⊆ C(X).
As a consequence of Remark 1, for x ∈ Rd+, a simple cone C(x) is fully described
by its apex x. The main consequence of this remark is that C(X) can be fully
described and represented by EFF[X]. For instance, since R[WST[E ],F ] is a
cone-union (thanks to Lemma 2), and since MO-CR = EFF[R[WST[E ],F ]] (by
definition of the MO-CR), then R[WST[E ],F ] is fully represented (as a cone-
union) by the MO-CR, which means that R[WST[E ],F ] = C(MO-CR).
Recall that q = |WST[E ]| and m = |F|. In this subsection, we also denote
WST[E ] = {y1, . . . , yq} and F = {z1, . . . , zm}. Let Amq denote the set of func-
tions pi from {1, . . . , q} to {1, . . . ,m}. (We have: |Amq | = mq.)
Corollary 1 (The cone-union of MO-CR).
Given WST[E ] = {y1, . . . , yq} and F = {z1, . . . , zm}, we have:
R[WST[E ],F ] =
⋃
pi∈Amq
q⋂
t=1
C(yt/zpi(t))
and therefore:
MO-CR[E ,F ] = EFF
[{∧q
t=1
yt/zpi(t) | pi ∈ Amq
}]
Proof. For the first statement, just think of an expansion. We write down
R[WST[E ],F ] = ∩y∈WST[E] ∪z∈F C(y/z)
into the layers just below. There is one layer per yt in WST[E ] = {y1, . . . , yt, . . . , yq}:
( C(y1z1 ) ∪ C(y
1
z2 ) ∪ . . . ∪ C( y
1
zm ) ) layer 1⋂
( C(y2z1 ) ∪ C(y
2
z2 ) ∪ . . . ∪ C( y
2
zm ) ) layer 2
...⋂
( C(yqz1 ) ∪ C(y
q
z2 ) ∪ . . . ∪ C( y
q
zm ) ) layer q
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Imagine the simple cones C( yt
zpi(t)
) as vertices and imagine edges going from
each vertex of layer t to each vertex of the next layer (t + 1). Let the func-
tion pi : {1, . . . , q} → {1, . . . ,m} denote a path from layer 1 to layer q, where
pi(t) is the vertex chosen in layer t. The expansion into a union outputs as
many intersection-terms as paths from the first layer to the last one. Conse-
quently, in the result of the expansion into an union, each term is an intersection⋂q
t=1 C(yt/zpi(t)). Then one has:
R[WST[E ],F ] =
⋃
pi∈Amq
q⋂
t=1
C(yt/zpi(t))
=
⋃
pi∈Amq
C
(
q∧
t=1
yt/zpi(t)
)
= C
({
q∧
t=1
yt/zpi(t) | pi ∈ Amq
})
The second statement results from the first statement, Lemma 2 and Remark
1. That R[WST[E ],F ] = C(MO-CR) and then EFF[R[WST[E ],F ]] = MO-CR
(from Remark 1) concludes the proof.
Ultimately, this proves the correctness of Algorithm 1 for the computation of
MO-CR, given WST[E ] = {y1, . . . , yq} and F = {z1, . . . , zm}. It consists in the
iterative expansion/construction of the intersection R[WST[E ],F ], which can be
seen as dynamic programming on the paths of the layer graph. For k ∈ {1, . . . , q},
we denote Dt the description of the cone-union corresponding to the intersection:
C(Dt) = ∩tl=1 ∪z∈F C(yl/z)
Recursively, for t > 1, C(Dt) = C(Dt−1) ∩ (∪z∈F C(yt/z)). From Lemma 2,
Remark 1 and Corollary 1, in order to construct, we then have to iterate the
following:
Dt = EFF[{ρ ∧ (yt/z) | ρ ∈ Dt−1, z ∈ F}]
We now proceed with the time complexity of Algorithm 1. At first glance,
since there are mq paths in the layer graph, then there are O(mq) elements in
MO-CR. Fortunately, they are much less, because we have:
Theorem 7 (MO-CR is polynomially-sized).
Given a MOG and denoting d = |D|, q = |WST[E ]| and m = |F|, we have:
|MO-CR| ≤ (qm)d−1
Proof. Given ρ ∈ MO-CR, for some pi ∈ Amq , we have ρ =
∧q
t=1 y
t/zpi(t), and
then ∀k ∈ D, ρk = mint=1...q{ytk/zpi(t)k }. Therefore, ρk is exactly realized by the
kth component of at least one cone apex yt/zpi(t) in the layer graph (that is
a vertex in the layer-graph above). Consequently, there are at most as many
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possible values for the kth component of ρ, as the number of vertices in the layer
graph, that is qm. This holds for the d components of ρ; hence there are at most
(qm)d vectors in MO-CR. More precisely, by Lemma 3 (below), since MO-CR is
an efficient set, then there are at most (qm)d−1 vectors in MO-CR.
Lemma 3. Let Y ⊆ Rd+ be a set of vectors, with at most M values on each
component:
| EFF[Y ] | ≤Md−1
Proof. For instance, in R2+, considering the M ×M grid in the plane, there is
at most one Pareto-efficient vector per column, hence |EFF[Y ]| ≤ M . Think of
each vector as having one and d−1 components. Fixing these last components, a
single-objective optimization problem on the first objective occurs. Hence there
is one optimum. Furthermore, there are at most Md−1 valuations realized on the
d − 1 other components. If you fix the d − 1 last components, there is at most
one Pareto-efficient vector: it maximizes the first component.
In Algorithm 1, there are Θ(q) steps. At each step t, from Theorem 7, we know
that |Dt−1| ≤ (qm)d−1. Hence, |{ρ ∧ (yt/z) | ρ ∈ Dt−1, z ∈ F}| ≤ qd−1md, and
the computation of the efficient set Dt requires time O((qd−1md)2d). Ultimately,
Algorithm 1 takes q steps and then timeO(q(qd−1md)(qm)d−1d) = O((qm)2d−1d).
If d = 2, this lowers to O((qm)2 log2(qm)), by using a data structure (e.g. an AVL
tree) that orders vectors according to the first objective and does comparisons
on the second objective.
14 Proof of Lemma 1
This proof simply consists in chaining the quantifiers in the definitions, that have
been carefully chosen to prove the result.
(1) First, let us show R[E,F ] ⊆ R[WST[E ],F ]. Let ρ′ be a ratio of R[E,F ]
and let us show that:
∀y ∈WST[E ], ∃z ∈ F , s.t.: y % ρ′ ? z
Take y ∈ WST[E ]. From the first condition, there is a y′ ∈ E such that y % y′.
From MO-CR, there is a z′ such that y′ % ρ′ ? z′. From the third condition on
z′, there exists z ∈ F such that z′ % z. Recap: y % y′ % ρ′ ? z′ % ρ′ ? z.
(2) Then, let ρ be a ratio of R[WST[E ],F ], and let us show that
ρ′ = (1 + ε1)−1(1 + ε2)−1ρ is in R[E,F ], that is:
∀y′ ∈ E, ∃z′ ∈ F, (1 + ε1)y′ % (1 + ε2)−1ρ ? z′
Take an element y′ of E. From the second condition, there is y ∈WST[E ] such
that (1 + ε1)y
′ % y. From MO-CR, there is z ∈ F such that y % ρ ? z. From
the fourth condition on z, there exists z′ ∈ F s.t. z % (1 + ε2)−1z′. Recap:
(1 + ε1)y
′ % y % ρ ? z % (1 + ε2)−1ρ ? z′.
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15 Proof of Theorem 6
Applying Algorithm 1 on E and F outputs an ((1 + ε1)(1 + ε2))-covering of
R(WST[E ],F). Moreover, since we have |E| = O((1/ε1)d−1) and
|F | = O((1/ε2)d−1), Algorithm 1 takes time O
(
d/(ε1ε2)
(d−1)(2d−1)).
16 Experiments
Experiments were conducted to assess the practicality of our polynomial time
and approximation algorithms. We used C++STL on a Linux laptop equipped
with CPUs at 1.40Ghz. We fixed |Ai| = 2 actions per agent. For each parameter-
values, we averaged the measures over 5 random instances8. The evaluations
uik(a
N (i)) are drawn uniformly and independently in |[1, 16]|. In Table 1 (for
MOGs) we have N (i) = N . In Table 2 (for MO graphical games), the games
were drawn on grid graphs with dimensions n = n1×n2, in order to experiment
various treewidths9. We chose n2 ∈ {1, 2, 3} for the interaction-graph’s width,
which corresponds to the treewidths T ∈ {2, 4, 6}.
16.1 Computational measures on MO normal forms
In Table 1, we experiment Algorithm 1 on MO games. Table 1’s notations are: d
for the number of objectives; n for the number of agents; T(P1) for the cpu-time
(seconds) of Phase 1: computing WST[E ] and F ; m = |F| and q = |WST[E ]|;
T(P2) for the cpu-time (seconds) of Phase 2: computing MO-CR given WST[E ]
and F ; and finally, (in order to assess the practicality of the algorithm’s output)
the size of the resulting MO-CR.
d = 2 d = 3 d = 4
n 4 8 12 4 8 12 4 8 12
T (P1) 0.00 0.08 2.40 0.00 0.07 2.45 0.00 0.08 2.44
m 4.2 5.6 8.2 5.4 17.8 41.2 7.2 36.4 105.8
q 2.2 4 5.8 4.4 9.8 30.2 8 37.8 82.6
T (P2) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.20 0.00 0.48 30.85
#MO-CR 3.4 4.6 6 3.2 22.8 31.8 13.6 44.4 154.8
Table 1: Computation times for Phases 1 and 2 on MO normal forms
Observations. Recall that the normal form is a representation of sizeΘ(nαnd).
For instance, for d = 3, Phase 1, and n = 4, 8, 12, the instance to read is made of
192, 6144 and 147456 scalars. The cpu-time cost of Phase 1 depends directly on
8 Though only 5 random instances does not sound like much, the measures of cpu-time
were already stable
9 For a formal definition of the treewidth, the reader may refer to [11,19] or [18].
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the size of this input. For d ≤ 3, Algorithm 1 costs nothing, compared to Phase
1. For d ≥ 4, we begin to perceive the explosion of Algorithm 1 (Phase 2), while
m, q ' 100. This indicates a practical intractability for d ≥ 4. Recall that the
cost of Algorithm 1 (Phase 2) for d = 4 is O((mq)7).
16.2 Computational measures on MO graphical games
In Table 2, we experiment the approximation scheme on MO graphical games.
After Phase 1, we take smaller representations of WST[E ] and F : a (1 + ε1)-
under-covering of WST[E ] with ε1 = 6.5%, and a (1 + ε2)-stick-covering of
F with ε2 = 3.5%, all in order to ensure a (1 + ε)-covering of MO-CR, with
ε ' 6.5% + 3.5% = 10% (thanks to Theorem 6). Table 2’s notations are the
same as Table 1’s, and we add: n2 for the width of the interaction graph; mε for
the resulting size (after a proper rounding) of the representation of F ; and qε
for the resulting size (after a proper rounding) of the representation of WST[E ].
d = 2
n2 = 1 n2 = 2 n2 = 3
n 60 120 180 60 120 180 60 120 180
T (P1) 0 3 13 1 11 43 4 37 159
m 92 212 347 76 186 316 65 174 300
q 47 120 217 49 134 222 46 134 228
mε 5 5 4.6 5.6 5 4.4 4.6 4.8 5
qε 7.4 7.4 7 7.6 7.4 7.2 7 7.4 7.6
T (P2) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
#MO-CR 3.8 2.6 3.6 3.4 3.4 3 3.6 2.4 3
d = 3
n2 = 1 n2 = 2 n2 = 3
n 12 24 36 12 24 36 12 24 36
T (P1) 0 1 8 0 2 15 0 4 40
m 42 263 777 44 249 596 49 190 474
q 27 236 645 31 143 506 38 159 448
mε 15.6 19.8 22.8 16.8 27.4 26.6 17.8 22 25.2
qε 24.8 45.8 53.2 26.2 59.2 63 27.8 45.2 53
T (P2) 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.06
#MO-CR 15.6 13.4 12.8 8.8 11.8 14.4 12.4 15 12.8
Table 2: Computation times for Approximations on MOGGs
Observations. As seen in Table 1 when m, q ' 100, computing MO-CR would
be experimentally intractable, if done directly on WST[E ] and F . Fortunately,
thanks to the approximation scheme, Algorithm 1 costs almost nothing on the
smaller representations of WST[E ] and F , compared to computation of Phase 1.
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16.3 A raw example of MO-CR
ρ2
ρ1
0
.5
1
.5 1
Fig. 6: MO-CR of one MOG with n = 7 agents, d = 2 objectives, α = 3 actions-
per-agent, and independent evaluations drawn uniformly in {1, . . . , 100}
The white part corresponds to the set of guaranteed ratios of efficiency
ρ ∈ R[E ,F ] ∩ [0, 1]d and the dark-blue part to ρ /∈ R[E ,F ]. Recall that if
ρ ∈ R[E ,F ], then ρ guarantees that for each equilibrium-outcome y ∈ E , there
exists an efficient-outcome z(y) such that y % ρ ? z(y). Conversely, if ρ /∈ R[E ,F ],
then there exists an in-efficient equilibrium y ∈ E , that is: such that what-
ever z ∈ F , the guarantee y % ρ ? z(y) does not hold. In other words, for each
ρ ∈ R[E ,F ], it holds that each equilibrium has at least ρ times some efficiency.
